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INTRODUCTION
Parties have been settling disputes without court intervention
for hundreds of years.' This phenomenon has been unified recently
in the dispute resolution movement. However, the enforceability
of settlement agreements is not a settled issue.2 This uncertainty
could block a more widespread use of mediation,3 especially when
the determination of a court is already universally accepted as
enforceable. 4 This Article examines the issues surrounding the en-
forceability of mediated agreements.
I. VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
Disputants are nearly twice as likely to comply voluntarily with
mediated agreements than with court-imposed judgments.5 The
reason for this phenomenon stems from the fact that the legitimacy
of a court decision "depends on an explicit reasoned connection
between the result and a general rule," 6 while a consensus between
the parties often produces a sense of fairness which is frequently
not as readily apparent in the judicial arena.7 Mediated agreements
are more likely to reflect what the parties want or are willing to
accept because their idiosyncrasies can be incorporated into the
agreement.8 Guarantees backed by personal honor "may...
1. See H. GLICK. COURTS, POLITICS & JUSTICE 119-22 (1983); E. JOHNSON. V.
KANTON & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES
IN CIVIL CASES 1, 4-6 (1977); H. JACOB. JUSTICE IN AMERICA: COURTS. LAWYERS & THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 200, n.7 (3d ed. 1978).
2. See generally Cappelletti & Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave
In the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 181
(1978).
3. Hileman, Environmental Dispute Resolution, 17 ENVTL. SCI. &TECH. 165A
(1983).
4. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1084-85 (1984).
5. McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Courts: Achieving Com-
pliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc. REV. 11, 11 (1984). (Eighty percent of
mediated parties who agreed to perform some obligation for another party fully
complied with that obligation within 6-18 months. This figure compares to a 44.5%
rate for adjudicated defendants who had a judgment rendered against them.
Failure to perform even partially was found to be about four times more likely
in adjudicated than in mediated cases.)
6. W. DEJONG, G. GOOLKASIAN, & D. MCGILLIS, THE USE OF MEDIATION AND AR-
BITRATION IN SMALL CLAIMS DISPUTES 41 (1983).
7. McEwen & Mainman, supra note 5, at 40.
8. For a detailed explanation of how to draft mediated agreements in order
to encourage voluntary compliance, see Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View
of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754
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structure later behavior in accordance with prior commitments,
as may the possibility of embarrassment. These overlapping
pressures presumably work independently of formal controls ema-
nating from the courts." 9
Some parties, though, will fail to comply with the provisions of
their mediated agreements. Alternatives to remedy such noncom-
pliance include ignoring the breach, attempting renegotiations, and
enforcing court orders.10 This last alternative raises the issue of
the enforceability of mediated agreements.
II. COURT ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
A. Need for an Enforcement Theory
Whether a court of law will enforce a mediated agreement is in-
tegral to the mediating parties. When one party breaches its duties,
the aggrieved party may wish to hold the breaching party to the
terms of the mediated agreement." Alternately, many parties
refuse to mediate because they do not want to devote time to draw-
ing up a non-binding agreement.
Mediated agreements may already be enforceable, especially in
the five jurisdictions that have taken a position on the enforcement
issue. 12 However, in the other jurisdictions where no controlling
(1984); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement &
Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637 (1976); Wheeler, Environmental Disputes: The
Problem of Enforcing Negotiated Agreements, in A Study of Barriers to the Use
of Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 74 (Vermont Law School Dispute
Resolution Project ed. 1984).
9. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 5, at 43.
10. Freedman, Legal Issues in Mediation: Are Mediation Agreements En-
forceable 3 (1984) (unpublished manuscript available from The American Bar
Association, Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C.).
11. In the words of Adam Smith, "The foundation of contract is the reasonable
expectation, which the person who promises raises in the person to whom he binds
himself; of which the satisfaction may be extorted by force." A. SMITH. LECTURES
ON JUSTICE, POLICE. REVENUE. & ARMS 7 (Carman ed. 1896) cited in Kessler & Sharp,
Contract as a Principle of Order, Chapter 24 IN: SOCIETY & THE LEGAL ORDER at 156
(Schwartz & Skolnick eds. 1970).
12. The Neighborhood Justice Center in Atlanta, Georgia informs its par-
ticipants that a mediated agreement will be upheld by a court as a valid contract.
Freedman, supra note 10, at 15. Statutes in the State of New York authorize the
incorporation of mediated agreements into enforceable arbitration awards. Id. In
1973, the State of Colorado enacted House Bill 1506, § 13-22-308 which provides
that any mediated agreement reduced to writing and approved by a court "shall
be enforceable as an order of the court." See also Model State Legislation on Media-
tion, in LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 290-296 (ABA Special Committee on
Dispute Resolution ed. 1984). If a mediated agreement is approved by a court in
Arizona, the agreement is considered binding. The same is true in the District of
Columbia so long as the agreement is free of fraud, improper awards, or gross ar-
bitrator conduct. Id. at 251.
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law exists, courts may be uncertain whether to enforce the
mediated agreement. 13
13. Any state will bind parties to a true accord and satisfaction or substitute
agreement. The problem lies in convincing the court that a mediated agreement
qualifies for enforcement. If the agreement itself provides that it operates as a
discharge of an existing claim, the agreement can qualify as a substituted con-
tract. 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1269 (1962). If it is not agreed at the time of
creating the agreement that the promises contained in the agreement are accepted
as a proper discharge of prior claims, the agreement will constitute only an ex-
ecutory accord, i.e., the prior claim is intended to be discharged only when the
compromise performance is rendered. Id. at § 1268. In other words, if one party
promises to forbear suing another party if the other promises to do something,
it seems as if the parties intend that the potential plaintiffs claim and the poten-
tial action are to be discharged only when the other does what he promises. "[I]t
is the 'performance' of the compromise that is to operate as final satisfaction. If
the debtor breaks the compromise agreement, the suspension [of prior claims] is
lifted and the creditor can again enforce his former claim." Id.
Compromises are frequently specifically enforced without any discussion
of whether only an executory accord or an actual substituted agreement is involved.
Id. citing Moers v. Moers. 128 N.Y. 294, 128 N.E. 202 (1920) (the court specifically
enforced an accord executory describing it, however, as a substituted contract).
The distinction between an executory accord and a substituted contract is based
on a question of fact and determination of the parties' intentions. J.CALAMARI &
J, PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 21-6 (2d. ed., 1977). However,
The more deliberate and formalized the agreement, the more likely the par-
ties intended to substitute the present agreement for prior claims. Goldbard
v. Empire State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 A.D.2d 230, 171 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't
1958). In cases involving liquidated undisputed obligations, however, it will
generally be presumed that the creditor did not intend to surrender his prior
rights unless and until the new agreement is actually performed.
Id. See also Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 215,406 A.2d 922 (1979) (a release
of claims made at the time the agreement is made is evidence that the new agree-
ment was designed to be a substituted contract).
If all the elements of a true substituted contract exist, i.e., the parties in-
tend that the new agreement constitutes a substitute for prior claims and the
substituted contract immediately discharges the original claim, Clark 286 Md.
at 214, two events could occur. If the original wrongdoer complies with the new
agreement, the underlying breach will be subsumed within the new contract and
the original victim cannot sue, as that would breach the substituted contract. See
6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1274 (1962): "As long as the debtor has committed no
breach of the accord, therefore, the creditor should be allowed to maintain no action
for the enforcement of the prior claim." If the original wrongdoer does not comply
with the substituted contract, he can be required by a court to specifically per-
form it under threat of jail or other contempt powers.
Even if the mediated agreement does not qualify as a substituted contract,
i.e., the parties did not specifically intend for the promises contained in the agree-
ment to discharge prior claims and expected only the promised performance to
act as a discharge, executory accords are still enforceable. 286 Md. 208. The Clark
court held that even though the promised performance has been completed, the
prior victim could not sue the prior wrongdoer for the prior claim sought to be
settled in the executory accord unless the other party breaches the accord or gives
the prior victim reason to believe prospective nonperformance is inevitable. See
387
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Professor Fiss 1 4 warns that a judge will have no basis for assess-
ing requests related to mediated agreements because reconstruc-
tion of the factual and legal situation as it existed at the time the
agreement was entered into would border on the absurd.15 Although
Professor Fiss' criticism justifies enforcement of the original med-
iated agreement, it improperly assumes that courts do not currently
engage in reconstructing other disputes. Rather, courts often re-
construct a disputed contract during litigation. Therefore, a court's
treatment of mediated agreements as contracts may clarify the
questions surrounding the enforceability of mediated agreements.
An enforceable mediated agreement is beneficial because it
assures disputants that their resolution in the mediation is final,
and avoids the burden and expense of litigating the underlying
liabilities and claims finalized by the agreement.
B. Enforcing Mediated Agreements as Contracts
If a party seeks to enforce a mediated agreement as a contract,
it must meet all of the common law elements of an enforceable
contract. 16 Several of these common law elements, such as mutual
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 417 (1932) regarding a contract to accept a stated
performance in satisfaction of a duty to make compensation:
(a) Such a contract does not discharge the duty, but suspends the right to
enforce it as long as there has been neither a breach of the contract nor a
justification for the creditor in changing his position because of its prospec-
tive non-performance.
(b) If such a contract is performed, the previously existing duty is discharged.
(c) If the debtor breaks such a contract the creditor has alternative rights.
He can enforce either the original duty or the subsequent contract.
The author assumes that the difficulty of establishing a true substituted
contract, the ability to sue on the original claim or "the subsequent contract" (if
one established only an executory accord), or the theory's reliance on contract
principles will inevitably necessitate discussion of contract law and whether the
mediated agreement qualifies as an enforceable contract.
14. Fiss supra note 4, at 1083.
15. Id. at 1084.
16. Enforceable contracts require an offer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CON-
TRACTS §§ 17 et seq. (1979); 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts §§ 31 et seq. (1964). This
is typically viewed as a proposition generated by one of the parties to the con-
tract, but the fact that a term is suggested by a third party, such as a mediator,
does not create a barrier to enforcement. The parties themselves modify and fimalize
all proposed terms and thereby may be seen as adopting the mediators's sugges-
tions as their own.
Enforceable contracts require acceptance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 50 etseq. (1979); 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts §§ 41 etseq. (1964.) This
term implies a voluntary meeting of the minds and will be discussed in the con-
text of freely and knowingly consenting to the agreement's terms. See text, infra
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assent, consideration, compliance with public policy, appropriate
authority, lack of mistake, and impossibility pose barriers to per-
suading a court to enforce a mediated agreement as a contract.
1. Mutual Assent
To establish a contract, both parties must voluntarily assent to
its proposed terms. Undue influence or coercion that sufficiently
taints the validity of the consent can make the agreement voidable 7
Although moral pressures and disparities in power and resources
may affect the consent requirement, the courts nevertheless tol-
erate a significant degree of constraint without earmarking a con-
tract voidable for lack of voluntary consent. The legal standard is
that each party's consent was given with the full knowledge that
each retained the alternative to refuse. Consent given, no matter
how grudgingly, with the knowledge that it could have been with-
held, leaves intact the validity of the contract 8 If the voluntary con-
sent element of the contract is subsequently challenged in court,
the law imposes on the promisor the burden of proof to demon-
strate that the agreement was created without undue influence
or coercion. 19
Imbalanced bargaining power and unequal transaction costs be-
tween the mediating parties can threaten the voluntariness of the
consent given by the parties. This inequality is predominant in
pp. 187-188 and accompanying notes 17-23 for mediation-specific concerns.
Enforceable contracts require consideration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 71 et seq. (1979); 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts §§ 85 et seq. (1964.)
See text, infra, pp. 189-190 and accompanying notes 24-32 for mediation-specific
concerns.
Enforceable contracts require appropriate authority of each signatory to
bind the entity being represented. 3 AM. JuR. 2d Agency H8 311 eL seq. (1964);
17 AM. JuR. 2d. Contracts § 294 (1964). See text, infra, pp. 192-193 and accom-
panying notes 41-42 for mediation-specific concerns.
Enforceable contracts also require legal capacity of the parties, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS H8 12 et seq. (1979); 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 16
(1964) and a writing wherever required by law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 110 et seq. (1979); 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 67.
Additionally, if any of the following conditions are present, the contract
will not be enforceable: fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159 et seq. (1979); 17 AM. JuR. 2d Con-
tracts 8H 151-154 (1964).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS H§ 175 (duress makes a contract
voidable) and § 177 (undue influence makes a contract voidable); 17 AM. JuR. 2d
Contracts H§ 151-54 (1964).
18. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 5, at 13.
19. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 749 (1952).
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domestic violence cases in which a pattern of dominance of one
spouse over the other has already been established. 20 It is also
predominant in environmental disputes which frequently pit large
corporations against local landowners.21
Some inspection of the consent obtained in the mediation set-
ting may be necessary to insure a fair result. 22 It is difficult to create
standards that safeguard the fairness of the bargaining process.
One problem is that standards regulating the mediator's conduct,
where they exist, do not give specific guidelines for determining
proper mediator intervention in the bargaining process. 2 3 If a
mediator makes no attempt to remedy imbalances between par-
ties, lack of advice (legal or otherwise) may render an agreement
unenforceable because consent given out of ignorance is not valid.
Where, for example, one party has been able, with the mediator's
acquiescence, to convince another to bargain away unknown
rights, or where one party falsely indicates that he or she has given
up a legal right to sue, the agreement could fail for lack of con-
sent. Only if the mediator corrects any power or informational
disparities that could potentially destroy the informed consent re-
quirement should the resulting agreement be enforceable.
Thus, although mediation involves special consent concerns, a
fairly bargained-for-agreement, properly supervised by a mediator
sensitive to the necessity of obtaining voluntary consent by par-
ties aware of the option to refuse, yields a valid and enforceable
contract.
20. See generally, L. Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress
on Family Law Issues in the Courts and Legislatures, National Center on Women
and Family Law (1985).
2 1. RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DISPUTES (L. Susskind, L. Bacow,
and M. Wheeler eds. 1984) at 1. Although the editors recognize that no two com-
panies have the same resources to draw upon in negotiation, they nevertheless
advocate the use of informal dispute resolution methods to solve environmental
regulatory disputes. The seven case studies in the book examine the obstacles
to informal conflict resolution in this area. Also, see J. MARKS. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN AMERICA: PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION (1984) at 6.
22. Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties & The Just Compensa-
tion Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model & A Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 593-4 (1977); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(b)-10(c)
(1976) federal arbitration award vacated only
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
23. See e.g., Code of Professional Conductfor Mediators, (adopted by the Col-
orado Council of Mediation Organizations April 5, 1982) in which the responsibility
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2. Consideration
To establish a contract, the parties must show that they ex-
changed adequate consideration. 24 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, section 74, considers even a forbearance to assert a claim
or defense adequate consideration if the claim or defense is valid
or asserted in good faith.25 The consideration requirement is worth
studying in the mediation context, because the underlying dispute
may involve unclarified rights, claims, or interests. 26
If, for example, a consumer buys a car that has needed repeated
servicing, the consumer may have a claim against the manufac-
turer depending on the nature of the problem involved. If the
manufacturer could in any way be held liable for a defect, the con-
sumer's forbearance in filing suit is still consideration under the
Restatement theory since the consumer is surrendering a claim
that could be asserted in good faith. If the manufacturer clearly
is not responsible, the consumer cannot assert a claim for liability.
Therefore, the consumer's forbearance to sue would not be valid
consideration. Regardless of the facts, a manufacturer may be
motivated to settle the dispute in order to maintain a favorable
reputation.
A court will generally respect a contract that the parties deem
to be reasonable27 and thus will not assess the adequacy of the con-
of the mediator is defined:
A mediator is obliged to educate the parties... [and] must not consider him
or herself limited to keeping the peace or regulating conduct at the bargain-
ing table... [and] should be... [an] active resource person... prepared to
provide both procedural and substantive suggestions .... In the event a party
needs additional information or assistance in order for the negotiations to
proceed in a fair and orderly manner or for an agreement to be reached that
is fair, equitable and has the capacity to hold over time, the mediator is
obligated to refer the party to resource .... At no time will a mediator offer
legal advice to parties in dispute.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1979): If the require-
ment of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of
(a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or
detriment to the promissee; or
(b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or
(c) "mutuality of obligation."
25. E. FARNSWORTH & A. MCCORMACK. CONTRACTS § 2.12.
26. Professor Farnsworth notes that, if the claim or defense is doubtful because
of the claimant's subjective uncertainty as to the facts or law (as opposed to being
truly an "unfounded" claim), the courts have diluted the claim requirement to
find adequate consideration. Id. at 71, (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 74(1)(b) (1979).
27. Schultz. Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Modelfor State Policy,
70 CAL. L. REv. 207,229 (1982): "[U]nder contract norms the law should not
review the adequacy of the consideration, but should defer to the judgment of the
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sideration exchanged. 28 A court that might otherwise decline to
enforce a mediated agreement because the underlying claim is in-
valid and consideration is lacking,29 may still enforce the agree-
ment, recognizing that the promisor is bargaining for peace of
mind. Professor Farnsworth comments that, "[the promisor] 'can
hardly be heard to say that the claim... was obviously invalid and
frivolous when it attached enough importance to it to make the
contract in question.' 30 The principle of freedom of contract cou-
pled with the recognition that individuals are capable of assess-
ing the value of their interests suggests that courts should respect
the parties' mediated agreement.
Even if a claim asserted in good faith is later discovered to be
invalid, it still may make sense to enforce a settlement based on
that claim. In support of this contention, Professor Farnsworth
explains:
We ask not whether the claimant is barred from enforcing the underlying
claim, but whether the claimant can enforce the promise made in settle-
ment. The policy favoring such compromises of disputed claims suggests
that the claimant be allowed to enforce the promise, even if his settled
claim later proves to be invalid. 31
Imposing consideration requirements on settlement agreements
has been questioned by commentators and eliminated by some
state legislatures. 32 Such statutes remove the concern that uncer-
tain claims used as part of the consideration exchanged in nego-
tiating a mediated agreement which endanger enforceability.
Therefore, consideration should not present an obstacle to judicial
enforcement of the mediated agreement, even though the value
of the consideration may be difficult to ascertain.
3. Public Policy
Many courts favor voluntary agreements so highly that they
generally will uphold them.33 Efficiency interests are served by the
enforcement of an agreed allocation of risks.34 However, mediated
agreements, like traditional contracts, will not be enforced if the
parties," (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 79, 71, comment c [19811]).
28.R. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (1972).
29. FARNSWORTH. supra note 25, at § 2.12.
30. Id. at 72.
31. Id. at 69-70.
32. Id. at § 2.18.
33. See e.g., Bergstrom v. Sears, 532 F. Supp 923 (D. Minn. 1982) (trial courts
possess inherent power to enforce settlement agreements).
34. Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage; A New Modelfor State Policy,
70 CAL. L. REv. 207, 219 (1982):
392 [Vol. 1:2
1986] ENFORCEABILITY OF MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
parties have agreed to violate the law or certain principles of public
policy. 35
Public policy can conflict in the area of mediation. On the one
hand, society has an interest in resolving disputes within its system
of formal litigation. On the other hand, the established legal system
encourages compromise and settlement. 36 Mediation agreements
terminate the need for litigation of the particular dispute. Public
policy may affect the enforceability of a mediated agreement to
the extent that a policy protects interests that extend beyond those
of the immediate parties.3 7
A difficulty arises in determining when public policy is frustrated
by a mediated agreement. 38 If, for example, parties have a com-
mon interest in protecting the confidentiality of the mediation ses-
sions, they may include in their agreement a term providing that
they will not subpoena the mediator in any later court proceedings
arising from the agreement. Parties may be unwilling to initiate
compromise discussions without such an assurance. Yet one party
may argue in court that this provision infringes upon the policy
of presenting all relevant evidence in legal proceedings. 39
To resolve these conflicting directives, public policy should pro-
Value choices would then be subjectively made, risks and obligations volun-
tarily assumed, and rights and goals individually selected. Once these in-
dividual choices were made in ways that satisfied the safeguarding criteria
..., a state choice, to allow contractual ordering would mean that public
enforcement within traditional limits would be accessible to a party aggrieved
by nonperformance of privately determined obligations.
This reduces transaction, error, and direct costs of litigating the original
dispute.
35. See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2d. Contracts §§ 155, 156, and 216 (1964).
36. It is the policy of the law to encourage compromise and settlement. See
In re General Motors. Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.)
cerL denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee note; 6
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1268 (1962); 15A AM. JUR. 2d. Compromise & Settlement
§ 5 (1964) and cases listed therein.
37. Goetz & Scott, supra note 22, at 527.
38. See supra note 36. One example of difficulties inherent in resolving such
competing policies is manifested in FED. R. EvID. 408 (1975). In federal court
litiagation, this rule excludes evidence of the offer or acceptance of "a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount... [but] does not require exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable... [nor any evidence] offered for another pur-
pose." Id. One public policy encouraging compromise conflicts with another public
policy encouraging presentation at trial of all relevant evidence (embodied in FED.
R. EVID. 402) "to the end that the truth may be ascertained." FED. R. EVID. 102
(1975).
39. See supra note 38.
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hibit parties from resolving a particular question inconsistent with
it only when the resolution of the dispute is controlled by statutes
or precendent designed to achieve a goal beyond the interests of
the parties to the mediation. 40
Public policy therefore, can threaten the enforceability of cer-
tain provisions of a mediated agreement. This potential barrier,
however, does not justify denying enforcement of mediated
agreements which include terms that do not contravene public
policy. Since public policy favors compromise, courts should up-
hold mediated agreements unless the particular term of a mediated
agreement violates a public policy aimed at accomplishing more
than justice between the parties. The determination may be made
on a case-by-case basis as is customarily done when courts are
called upon to enforce a contract. The validity of the mediated con-
tract concept should not be threatened by this potential for abuse.
4. Proper Authority
In multi-party disputes, the issue arises whether the parties
negotiating the mediated agreement have the authority to bind
other parties affected by the agreement but not present during
negotiations. This problem frequently arises in the context of en-
vironmental disputes.
The Grayrocks Dam controversy 4' is a classic example of a multi-
party environmental dispute. In 1970, six utilities formed the
Missouri Basin Power Project (MBPP), and advocated the construc-
tion of a $1.6 billion coal-fired electric power plant on the banks
of Wyoming's Laramie River, a tributary of the North Platte River.
To supply essential cooling water for the plant, MBPP proposed
to build a dam and reservoir on the Laramie River. The dam and
reservoir would divert 60,000 acre feet of water annually from the
Laramie River, and thus from the North Platte River.
Many groups criticized the MBPP proposal. Conservationists
feared the project would adversely affect the habitat of the whoop-
ing crane, an endangered species. Farmers downstream from the
proposed project site objected to the construction because the dam
would cut off the water supply they needed to irrigate their crops,
thus jeopardizing their livelihoods. The State of Nebraska opposed
the dam because the construction would force the state, which lies
40. Goetz & Scott, supra note 22, at 543.
41. This example is excerpted for L. BACON & M. WHEELER. supra note 21,
46-50 (1984).
394 [Vol. 1 :2
1986] ENFORCEABILITY OF MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
downstream from the Wyoming project to reduce its water supply.
In light of these concerns, a mediated agreement should bind
only thi immediate parties to the agreement. The mediator can
stress the parties' long-term interests in future compliance, thereby
encouraging them to include all interested parties in the media-
tion. Nevertheless, the mediated agreement will not be enforced
as a valid contract by a court if a careless mediator permits a
mediated agreement to be signed by persons lacking proper
authority to bind the necessary parties. 42 The proper authority re-
quirement may be fatal to the enforceability of some mediated
agreements.
5. Mistake
Contracts may be voided on the ground that, at the time of con-
tract formation, a party made a mistake of law or fact, but claims
of mistake are less tenable when enforcing mediated agreements.
In traditional contract negotiations, the parties often deal with con-
crete facts and issues, for instance, price. Thus courts hold the con-
tracting parties only to risks actually exchanged. 43 In mediation,
negotiations frequently revolve around uncertain facts and issues.
Courts should be less receptive to legal claims based on mistake,
since parties to a mediation are aware of the inherent possibility
of errors in judgment.
Many settlements are upheld in spite of mistakes as to law or
fact, since, by settling, the parties have demonstrated a preference
for reaching a final resolution over clarifying inaccuracies. 44 By
agreeing to resolve a dispute in mediation, disputants are aware
that a court could decide the dispute differently. As an incentive
to mobilize mediation discussions, a mediator often will remind
the parties that they can choose certainty be resolving their dispute,
or risk the terms of that resolution by allowing a judge to
intervene.45 Professor Dobbs illustrates this point when he writes:
42. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 598 (1952). Another example can be found in
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 11(1): "A person is not entitled to rescind a transac-
tion with another if, by way of compromise or otherwise, he agreed with the other
to assume, or intended to assume, the risk of mistake for which otherwise he would
be entitled to rescission and consequent restitution."
43. For a general discussion of negotiation in a mediation forum and media-
tion strategies, See D KOLB. THE MEDIATORS (1983).
44. D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 11.10 at 773 (1973.)
45. GOLDBERG. GREEN, AND SANDER. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 115 (1985), quoting
GOLDBERG AND TAYLOR. MEDIATION 244-50 (1984). A mediated agreement can be
conducted as a check on the fairness of the agreement. Nevertheless, a court may
reach a different outcome if presented with the issue.
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[T]he owner of land, who settles a boundary dispute by conveying
acreage, without regard to the true boundary line, assumes the
risk that had he litigated ... he would have kept more land. He has
made no mistakes, since he knew this all along."'46
No relief is available for mistakes for which the parties have know-
ingly and voluntarily assumed the risk.4 7 Settlements should bind
the parties even if they later discover mistakes in judgment or
calculations upon which they relied in forming the mediated
agreement.
6. Impossibility
The enforcement of mediated agreements may be subject to at-
tacks based on the defense of impossibility if circumstances have
significantly changed since the agreement's formation so as to
make the basic purpose of the mediated agreement unachievable. 48
The general rule of impossibility excuses performance when con-
ditions that could render performance impossible were not
allocated during the bargaining process.4 9
A divorce medition session, for example, produces an agreement
in which the mother agrees to grant custody of a child to the father
and pay child support of a specified monthly sum until the child
reaches the age of majority. If the mother subsequently loses her
job, she may breach the child support agreement. If her former
husband sues for breach, she can attempt to assert the impossibility
defense. The trier of fact could determine that the mother assumed
the risk that she might lose her job. The fact alone that circum-
stances have changed does not foreclose the possibility that the
disputants allocated the benefits and burdens of the decision in
the bargaining process. Contract rules excuse performance based
upon impossibility "only where circumstances indicate risks were
unassigned."50
In sum, since mediated agreements are contracts, special atten-
tion may be required to insure that they meet the requirements
of enforceable contracts. However, even when a mediated agree-
46. See supra note 44, at 773.
47. Id. at 774.
48. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. Contracts § 13-8 (2d ed. 1977); 3 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 597-605 (1960); 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts §§ 406-423 (1964).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 (non-occurance of a con-
dition excuses performance); 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1321-33 (1962); 17 AM.
JUR. 2d Contracts § 404 (1964).
50. Goetz & Scott, supra note 22, at 586.
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ment satisfies the requisites of a contract, other barriers may
threaten its enforceability.
III. ENFORCING CONTRACTUAL PROMISES
Parties are likely to become embroiled in a dispute because they
believe another owes them a duty, and has breached that duty,
causing them harm. Upon the breach of one party's duty, the law
seeks to compensate the injured party. 51 The court may order com-
pensatory damages in the form of a monetary payment or perfor-
mance of an act. In a mediation session, disputants fix their own
compensatory damages for the perceived liability from a breach.
Opponents of mediation may attack it as an opportunity for par-
ties to exaggerate their damages and obtain significantly more than
if a court fixed the damage award.
A. Overcompensation or Penalities May be Unenforceable
Contracting parties may stipulate a formula for damages in an-
ticipation of a possible breach, in addition to promising to pay
money or perform some act. The formula, called a liquidated
damages clause, "will afford damages to the non-breaching party
even where he is unable to prove exactly what his damages may
be."5 2 Stipulating damages in this way enables parties to fix the
amount of anticipated damages upon breach by a party.
A liquidated damages clause is created at contract formation,
prior to any breach. Only if the mediated agreement contains a
liquidated damages clause (to specify compensation if the mediated
agreement is breached) will the clauses be subject to enforcement
limitations placed on such clauses.53 Courts will enforce the terms
of a liquidated damages clause5 4 unless the clause provides for a
damage award that is "unreasonably disproportionate to antici-
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981); 22 AM. JuR. 2d
Damages §§ 45-47 (1964).
52. D. DOBBS. supra note 44, § 12.5, at 821.
53. Examples of mediated agreements containing liquidated damage clauses
are: "I, X, agree to pay $200 to Y, in exchange for Y's giving up any potential litiga-
tion arising from this transaction, and if I do not fulfill my obligation I will pay
Y $5 for every day I am late" (resolution: X promises to pay, Y promises some
act; liquidated damages: X promises to pay); "I. X, agree to pay $200 to Y, in ex-
change for Y's giving up any potential litigation arising from this transaction, and
ff I do not, I will deliver the color television which ownership is disputed" (resolu-
tion: X promises to pay, Y promises some act; liquidated damages: X promises
some act.")
54. D. DOBBS. supra note 44.
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pated losses." Courts consider such disproportionate compensa-
tion an illegal penalty. 55
Whether a court will characterize a liquidated damages clause
as a penalty depends not only on the reasonableness of the damage
figure, but also on the difficulties of ascertaining actual damages
in the transaction. The more difficult it is to specify the amount,
the more likely a court is to enforce the parties' damage agree-
ment.56 Mediation tends to involve disputed liability and damage
amounts, thus a liquidated damages provision embodied in a med-
iated agreement will be viewed less often as a penalty than a similar
clause in a traditional contract. Courts prefer to uphold negotiated
damage agreements, and the liquidated damages clause contained
therein,5 7 because "the very existence of a freely negotiated agreed
damages provision is compelling presumptive evidence that it con-
stitutes the cost-minimizing alternative.... 8
Mediating parties, however, can elude to the "forbidden compen-
sation" issue by setting the amount of damages for a breach after
the breach occurs. If the parties mutually agree that a certain
amount compensates the harmed party and satisfactorily resolves
their dispute, that damage amount will not be subject to attack
as a penalty. Of course, it may be more difficult for the parties to
agree on an appropriate damage relief after breach.
Some commentators have challenged the assumption that par-
ties are overcompensated when they use a liquidated damages for-
mula. If this argument prevails, an otherwise unenforceable medi-
ated contract in which the formula for damages is based on sub-
jective criteria will be enforced. The basis for allowing enforcement
is that the parties know best what adequately compensates them,
and that the best resolution is one which results from a freely
bargained exchange.59
55. D. DOBBS, supra note 44, § 12.5 at 831.
56. Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause-When & How, 20 OHIO
ST. L.J. 221, 232, (1959).
57. Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 770 (Okla. 1965), cited in Goetz
& Scott supra note 22, at 593, n.104.
58. Goetz & Scott, supra note 22, at 586.
59. If the law requires that the breacher of even a freely-entered and fairly-
bargained for agreement only pay the provable damages, this fails to compensate
the nonbreacher for unprovable values. Goetz & Scott, supra note 22, at 555. The
"subjective and nonmonetary terms," see Schultz, supra note 27, at 215, are often
held dear and are determinedly bargained for during the mediation. Any judicial
remedy for broken mediated contracts ignoring such terms would not only be in-
complete, but would also allow the breacher to retain all the advantages of the
breach, Geotz & Scott, supra note 22 at 562-68.
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The courts should not judge the reasonableness of damages set
by the mediating parties to resolve their dispute, if damages are
not calculated using a liquidated damages clause. If the mediated
agreement contains an extravagant liquidated damages figure, the
breacher should not be able to simply argue "the amount is too
large, so therefore it's an illegal penalty" to prevent enforcement.
Since the breaching party previously agreed to the damage award,
he would have to raise other contractual arguments, such as fraud,
coercion, or undue influence, to render the mediated agreement
unenforceable.
B. Enforcement Concerns with Agreements Involving Prom-
ises to Pay Money
A party seeking to enforce a mediated agreement that contains
a promise to pay money will have to establish all the elements of
a valid contract. After the enforcing party establishes a valid con-
tract and secures a judgment against the breacher, the enforcing
party still faces difficulties in collecting the promised money. The
enforcing party must attend an execution hearing and present
evidence of the breaching party's assets, attach proceeds from a
judicial sale of the payor's property, face probable uncollectibility
of payment, and pay attorney's fees for all of the collection activities.
If the enforcing party cannot establish a per se valid contract,
then the nonbreacher will be prohibited from relying on the med-
iated agreement as a basis for automatic relief. The court may
nonetheless find that the nonbreacher suffered a harm which re-
quires compensation, and may order enforcement of the promise
to avoid injustice. 60
C. Enforcement Concerns of Agreements Involving Promises
to Perform An Act
If the mediating parties resolve their dispute by promising to per-
form an act6 l and the act is not performed as promised, the non-
breaching party may sue to enforce the mediated agreement. If the
agreement meets all the requirements of an enforceable contract,
the question arises whether the court will require the recalcitrant
party to perform the act promised rather than award monetary
60. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1l) (1981).
61. Even if the chief promises all involve promises to pay money, if the par-
ties agree to do some act if the money is not paid, that part of the agreement is
subject to the liquidated damage clause limitations.
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damages for the breach.
Performance of an act, as opposed to payment of money, is
classified in the law as an equitable remedy. 62 A party requesting
the court to order an equitable remedy must show the necessity
of such a remedy, since courts prefer to limit their orders to pay-
ment of money. A party making the request must prove that there
are no "adequate damages at law, ' 6 3 meaning that money alone
will not adequately redress the breach. 64 If a money award is
deemed insufficient, the court may order a "specific performance"
remedy. 65
Mediated agreements requiring performance of an act often com-
pel specific performance because of circumstances surrounding
the agreement, for instance if monetary damages are difficult to
prove. 66 A mediated agreement to allow a parent to visit a child
on weekends does not have an easily ascertainable price tag, and
money is an inadequate substitution for performance. The act is
the only compensation possible.
Though courts have invoked the remedy of specific performance,
section 366 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and common
law doctrines6 7 may limit its use. If specific performance would
impose on the court burdens of enforcement or supervision
disproportionate to the benefits gained from granting specific per-
formance, the court can deny granting the remedy. 68 Nevertheless,
this rule has not stopped courts from rendering detailed and com-
plex rulings, for instance, in disputes involving government agency
actions, prison reforms, school desegregation, mental hospital prac-
tices, bankruptcies, and trusts.69
62. D. DOBBS, supra note 44, at § 2.1.
63. Id. §§ 2.1, 12.2
64. Id. at 58.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) provides: "Specific
performance or an injuction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate
to protect the expectation interest of the injured party." Section 362 provides that
neither relief will be ordered "unless the terms of the contract are sufficiently cer-
tain to provide a basis for an appropriate order."
66. Schultz, supra, note 27, at 215 n.23. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 360 (1981); 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1142 (1964).
67. See D. DOBBS. supra note 44, at § 2.5: 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1171
(1964).
68. Professor Farnsworth lists limitations (beyond the inadequacy at law re-
quirement) on granting specific performance as "indefiniteness of terms, insecurity
as to the agreed exchange, difficulty in enforcement or supervision, unfairness, and
public policy." FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at § 12.7.
69. Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1980).
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Denying equitable remedies when an adequate remedy at law
is available has rarely barred specific performance requests when
family dispute settlement agreements are breached.70 In Buswell
v. Buswell, B. J. Buswell, a divorced husband, agreed in a separa-
tion agreement to name his children as beneficiaries of his life in-
surance policy.71 When Mr. Buswell borrowed on the policy and
made his second wife its beneficiary, the court compelled him to
restore the policy to its unencumbered state and reinstate the
children as beneficiaries.
72
Likewise, New York's highest court specifically enforced a couple's
antenuptial agreement, which compelled the defendant husband
to seek the advice of rabbinical authorities before finalizing a
divorce.7 3 Specific performance has been denied, however, when
one spouse requested enforcement of the other spouse's agreement
to move out of the city and never return, 74 or when an agreement
depended on the consent of a third party.75
The pattern of specifically enforcing family dispute settlement
agreements may stem from a belief that family matters, especially
family disputes, are best handled by those best able to weigh the
equities involved in the situation. Or perhaps the pattern is gen-
erated by recognizing that there is no adequate economic remedy
at law to settle family problems. In any event, re-examination of
legal standards prohibiting specific enforcement may be in order.
7 6
70. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. 2d (1955) Section 1 states that United
States courts have generally taken the view that when a separation agreement
(whether mediated or not mediated) provision is breached, specific performance
may be granted where the breached provision is fair, not against public policy,
the breach resulted in injury, and an adequate remedy by way of an action at law
is lacking.
71. Buswell v. Buswell, 377 Pa. 487, 105 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1954).
72. Id.
73. Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108,446 N.E.2d 136,459, N.Y.S.2d 572, cert
denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
74. Martin v. Martin, 5 A.D.2d 307, 172 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1958) (denying specific
performance on the grounds that petitioner had not sustained any legal damage).
75. Casady v. Modem Metal Spinning & Mfg. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10
Cal. Rptr. 790 (1961).
76. For a persuasive argument advocation expansion of specific performance
availability, see Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L. J. 271,
305-06 (1979) which concludes the following:
... [A] promissee to a breached contract is entitled to a damage award as
of right. . . Because specific performance is a superior method for achieving
the compensation goal, promisees should be able to obtain specific perfor-
mance on request. An expanded specific performance remedy would not
generate greater transaction costs than the damage remedy involves, nor
would its increased use interfere unduly with the liberty interests of pro-
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Professor Dobbs has noted that, although few cases have ad-
dressed whether disputants may contractually agree to specific per-
formance in the event of breach, 7 7 "if the legal remedy is...
either clearly adequate or clearly inadequate, perhaps an agree-
ment for specific performance ought to be given special weight,
•.. even if the legal remedy is quite adequate by traditional stan-
dards."78 Traditional contract doctrines adequately safeguard
against abuse of the mediation process.
D. Other Enforcement Mechanisms
The United States Supreme Court has held that consent .orders
may be construed as contracts for enforcement purposes.7 9 Dis-
putants who become parties to a mediated agreement may want
to structure the agreement as a consent decree. 0
Two federal government agencies that commonly use the con-
sent decree device to insure enforcement of their mediated
agreements are the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Common
provisions of EEOC conciliation agreements require such actions
as forbearing lawsuits, reinstating employees and expunging un-
misors. Making specific performance freely available also would eliminate
the uncertainty costs of planning and litigtion created by the difficulty of
predicting whether the remedy will be available. In addition, this reform
would reduce the negotiation costs incurred by parties in attempting to create
forms of contractual specific performance such as liquidated damage clauses.
Further, defenses to request for specific performance that rest on unfairness
of contract terms or prices and that differ from the defenses in actions at
law should be eliminated; the grounds for denial of specific performance
should be the same as those that now will bar a damage suit. Finally, the
defense based on difficulty of supervision should be greatly restricted. If the
law is committed to putting disappointed promisees in as good as a position
as they would have been had their promisors performed, specific performance
should be available as a matter of course to those promisees who request it.
77. D DOBBS, supra note 44, § 12.5, at 825.
78. Id. In addressing the opposing concern that equity courts only have juris-
diction where the remedy at law is inadequate, he writes:
[I]t is quite certain that equity jurisdiction is not jurisdictional and that courts
have used the word 'jurisdiction' only in a loose sense referring to the pro-
priety of equity action and not to the power of equity courts. The argument
that one cannot confer jurisdiction by contract, then, seems to have no
relevance to this particular problem.
79. United States v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 (1975).
80. Freedman, supra note 10, at 14. Consent decrees require the parties to
file in court a complaint, answer, and a stipulated judgment or decree approved
by the court. 47 AM. JUR. 2d JUDGMENTS § 1089 (1969).
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favorable entries from personnel records."' These provisions im-
pinge upon the employer's freedom of action and can impose great.
enforcement and supervisory burdens on the court. Yet, the bene-
fits gained from specific performance of these conciliation agree-
ments prevent the courts from denying specific performance of a
mediated contract on grounds of supervisory difficulties.
The EPA's consent decrees commonly require compelled interim
relief measures; compelled monitoring and sampling tests with
recorded results; and prompt notice of compliance or non-
compliance with every requirement of the decree.8 2 The EEOC's
and EPA's consent decrees are examples of restrictive agreements,
and noncompliance with such agreements can be remedied by
specific performance. These agencies' conciliation agreements
demonstrate that disputants can, within reason, freely agree to a
dispute settlement and still expect courts to enforce noncompliance
through specific performance.
Consent decrees are not the only avenue available to parties who
are already involved in litigation but wish to control the outcome
of their case. Parties may achieve substantial reductions in time
and enforcement costs by mediating throughout litigation. A trial
court has inherent power to supervise and enforce settlement
agreements reached by parties to an action that is pending before
the court.8 3 Enforcement may be by summary judgment,8 4 absent
a disagreement over the fact of the settlement,8 5 or resolution of
special circumstances may be sought. Parties may seek to resolve
enforcement barriers in an evidentiary hearing before the enforce-
ment action proceeds.8 6 Whether the court will summarily enforce
an agreement or conduct an evidentiary hearing depends on the
nature of the disputed issues.87
81. Procedures Precedent to a Conciliation Conference, EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL (BNA) No. 24, at 62:0011 (March 1979).
82. D. Riesel, Negotiation and Settlement in Environmental Litigation (1983)
(unpublished work presented to participants in the negotiation course for en-
vironmental professionals by American Arbitration Association and Environmental
Law Institute, Washington, D.C.).
83. Dankese v. Defense Logistics Agency, 693 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing
Autera v. Robinson, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 216, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 n. 10 (1969)).
84. National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney General, 94 F.R.D. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
85. Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F. Supp. 923 (D. Minn. 1982).
86. Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1984).
87. Id. (citing Millner v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 643 F.2d 1005, 1009
(4th Cir. 1981); Kukla v. National Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 619 (6th
Cir. 1973).
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Summary enforcement is predicated on the theory that: 1) a set-
tlement agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties to a
lawsuit constitutes a binding contract,88 and 2) an agreement to
settle a claim is enforceable like any other contract.8 9 Compromise
settlements, although generally governed by contract principles,
also have attributes of judgments in that they are "decisive
of the rights of the parties and serve to bar reopening of the
issues settled." 90
Courts often retain inherent jurisdiction to enforce settlement
agreements even if the case has been dismissed with prejudice. 91
When parties stipulate to settle an action, the reasoning is that they
consent to exercise of the court's power to compel compliance. 92
Many courts have exercised such "inherent jurisdiction" without
requiring an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction93 by
allowing the enforcing party to file a motion to vacate the dismissal
order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(B).94 Nonetheless,
the surest way to safeguard enforcement jurisdiction is to incor-
porate the settlement terms into the record of the proceedings. 95
CONCLUSION
Enforcement concerns should not prohibit treating mediated
agreements like traditional contracts. Mediation can create an en-
88. Mack v. Poison Rubber Co., 14 Ohio St. 3d 34, 470 N.E. 2d 902 (1984);
Spercel v. Sterling Industries, Inc., 31 Ohio St. 2d 36, 285 N.E.2d 324 (1972).
89. Fustok v. Conticommodity Service, Inc. 577 F. Supp. 852, 858 (S.D.N.Y
1984).
90. Gorman v. Holte, 164 Cal. App. 3d 984, 211 Cal. Rptr. 34, 37 (1985).
91. Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1983); Debose v. Mueller,
552 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
92. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. Central Transport, Inc., 726 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1984)
But cf. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 1180, 1190, n. 13 (8th Cir. 1984)
(there is no authority for use of contempt proceeedings to enforce a court-approved
settlement where its terms have not been incorporated into a court order, decree,
or judgment).
93. Fox v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 739 F.2d 929, 932 (3rd Cir. 1984) (citing
Arco Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
862, (1976). But cf. Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571
F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1978) (when settlement is not contained in district court's order
dismissing original action subsequent enforcement suit filed in same court requires
an independent jurisdictional basis). Accord Musifilm B.V. v. Spector, 568 F. Supp.
578 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
94. VanLeeuwen v. Farm Credit Admin., 600 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (D. Or. 1984)
(citing Arco Corp. (1976)).
95. See Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984); Seymour
v. City of Eau Claire, 112 Wis. 2d 313, 332 N.W.2d 821 (1983) (settlement needs
to be incorporated into the final judgment); Ohio State Tie & Timber Inc. v. Paris
Lumber Co., 8 Ohio App. 3d 236 (1982).
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forceable contract that will qualify an aggrieved party for an award
of damages or specific performance upon breach. At the time of
formation, special attention should be paid to the following areas
of concern in order to establish all of the elements of a traditional
contract: 1) ensuring a balanced negotiation so that undue in-
fluence, coercion and fraud do not taint the agreement; 2) ensur-
ing that each party has a good faith belief in all claims or defenses;
3) ensuring that the rights of parties not included in the agreement
are not infringed, and 4) ensuring that the liquidating damages
clause does not penalize the breaching party.
Even ifa specific agreement does not live up to all the traditional
requirements of court enforceable contracts, disputes may still be
resolved by mediation. Carefully constructed agreements incor-
porate incentives for accomplishing compliance, although the
threat of later resort to judicial coercion may be forfeited as a
bargaining chip. Mediation's goal is to allow the disputants to
resolve their problem and comply with their resolution. The
challenge is to construct a mediated agreement that either the
courts or the parties will enforce.
Cathleen Cover Payne

